Abstract: This article outlines the comparative history of British and French decolonisation in order to explain how imperialism has mutated into neo-colonialism and in order to explain how African states can emerge from poverty. It suggests that African states should look to East Asia for models of development but recognizes the multi-ethnicity and political instability which characterise African states as an imperialist legacy that stifles growth.

I. Decolonialisation: Inter Imperialist Rivalries

I. Decolonialisation: Inter Imperialist Rivalries

In order to understand the transformation of imperialism into neocolonialism we have to study the history of the imperialist powers. This is because the different imperialist powers had very different colonial policies and experiences with decolonization. For example, Portugal remained inthe imperialism game right up to the mid seventies, rather late in history, and only quit the imperialist game when the metropolitan government was ousted by a fascist coup in 1976 (leaving Angola and Mozambique to struggle through twenty plus years). Belgium in contrast decolonized in the mid 1960s, like most European states, however Belgian colonial history was reputed to have been particularly brutal. Germany of course was forced to quit the imperialist game in the 1920s by defeat in World War I.

The two powers with the longest and most widespread colonial influence were in fact Britain and France. Further, French and British colonial policy were in several ways assymetric. French imperialism sought, and seeks, to replicate French conceptions of civilization and culture. British imperialism on the other hand was far more pragmatic. Such assymetries are further neither black and white nor entirely evil. French colonialism for example offered education to substantial numbers of Africans, in exchange for the acceptance of European concepts of civilization, at least among the local elites. To this day around 150 million Africans are francophones and French is still in much of Africa the lingua franca. In contrast, British imperialism, while not quite as brutal as Belgian did very little to educate the masses, concentrating instead on educating only the elite. On the other hand democratic values appear to have been somewhat more succesfully transplanted. British imperialism in South Africa, and India - both were under British rule since as early as 1780 and it is somewhat unsurprising that it is in these two states that British ideas, for good or ill took best root. But democracy was also taken seriously in more recent colonies such as Malaya (now Malaysia) and Kenya. In either event, both France and Britain tried to replicate the metropole in Africa – with some success, and much incongruence. Colonialism certainly meant slavery, de jure or de facto, and war, and resource exploitation, but also entailed education and infrastructural development, notably railroads and ports but also telegraphs and undersea cables. This mixed bag certainly looked appealing in the 1880s and even as late as 1910 – and was shattered forever as a result of two inter imperialist world wars waged for market share and to reduce unemployment - if necessary by killing.

Our historical analys will try to illustrate these two colonial experiences in order to highlight their assymetries. Exposition of the historical experience is necessary in order to lay the foundation for discussion of neocolonialism which has not only failed to grow the african economy but which has in fact led to negative growth, indebtedness, and desertification and the necessary mechanism of control, coup and revolution. In other words, overt imperialism has been replaced, but by a far more destructive and dishonest system of purely economic exploitation.
 
 

A. The French Experience

French neocolonialism ended after a dozen years of civil war. Both Indochina and Algeria resisted the attempt to reimpose colonial rule after the second world war. France fought bloody and inconclusive wars in both these regions in an attempt to assure French colonial supermacy. In the end however the cost in French lives and treasure was not worth any resources thereby extracted; France capitaulated in Vietnam in 1954, was thoroughly humiliated in the Suez crisis of 1956 and was forced out of Algeria in the early 1960s. In the end the IV th republic collapsed and a million French colonists living for several generations in Africa were forced to resettle in France. Any observer in 1965 - would have concluded that French imperialism was dead, like a vampire with a stake driven through it’s heart.

Paradoxically this experience helped France. First, by being so clearly forced out of the imperialism business, France turned most of it’s energies to Europe. Having little hope of presenting itself as a credible global superpower, at least in 1965 France correctly turned toward it’s European partners, and became the military and diplomatic voice of the EU – backed with German economic and technological expertise. The "Franco-German axis" arose quite frankly out of the ashes of French imperialist defeat.

If things looked bleak in 1960 by 1970 French imperialism had largely reasserted itself. By the 1980s operation Manta in Chad, as well as the battle of Kolweizei had demonstrated that France was back in Africa in force and to stay. Overt imperialism had been replaced by neo-colonialism.

How did this happen?

First, we must understand that the collapse of the French republic in utter humiliation permitted the creation of the Vth republic. While the IV° republic was more democratic, the V° had a much more unified foreign policy, having adopted a mix of the American presidential system (the president serves for 7 years and determines foreign policy) and the British parliamentary system (the Prime Minister determines domestic party; though the system is bicameral the Sénat is in fact purely symbolic – unlike the President, who does indeed determine French foreign policy.

Constitutional stability – so absent in the IV° republic – was the necessary foundation for any succesful foreign policy. Placing Europe first was the second step. The third step however was the development of a neo-colonial system which is at once ingenious, honest, brutal, and cynical. In other words, French policy towards Africa is a case study in "realpolitik".
 
 

B. The British Experience

1. First Phase: Decolonisation with an aim to set up liberal democracies on the British Model: Attempt at Tutelage (1948 to 1960)

If French colonialism attempted stubbornly to maintain French dominance at swordpoint, British decolonialisation was both less violent and more flexible. British decolonisation is correctly analyzed as going through two main phases: during the first phase, an attempt was made to establish stable native governments which would be aligned with Britain for reasons of history, and culture. This idealistic vision of imperialism reflected the fact that the imperialists believed their own propaganda. Since all persons wish to think well of themselves and no person wishes to think ill of themself this is hardly surprising.
 
 

a. Colonial independance movements challenged Britain immediately after the end of the second world war.

Another in the series of assymetries between French and British colonialism/decolonisation is the fact that, while France was more often than not faced with reimposing it’s colonial grip on territories which had been occupied by pro-axis Vichy governments, Britain maintained it’s colonial rule throughout the war. In fact it is somewhat surprising that the only British colonies invaded were Egypt, Sudan, Malaya, and Burma.

However while Britain’s task was somewhat easier resistance to British rule occurred almost immediately upon the end of the war. India had in fact already resisted Britain prior to the war, and during the war refused to cooperate with Britain. Challenges to British imperialism can be conveniently analyzed as either anticipated or unexpected.
 
 

i. Anticipated Challenge: India

Britain fully expected to have to subdue the Indian independance movement after the war. Happily the transfer of power from Britain to India was relatively limited in violence – though the Indo Pakistani war, which was quite violent, was triggered as a result of independance. Still the history of India did at least present the hope to British imperialism that colonies could be replaced with loyal democratic members of the British Commonwealth and Empire (as it was then called). The transfer of power – excepting of course the series of Indo Pakistani wars – was relatively non violent and led to the creation of a reasonable facsimile of liberal democracy, particularly considering the poverty of India.

Thus if Britain's intention to transfer power peacefully and gradually to responsible democratic governments via a tutelage period was frustrated we should consider the unanticipated challenges to Britain’s hegemony in the post war world.
 
 

ii. Unanticipated Challenges

a. Debt

Britain ended the second interimperialist war in debt to the United States. Having liquidated all foreign capital holdings Britain was simply unable, despite hopes and very real efforts to the contrary, to maintain the pound sterling as the world’s currency standard. A humiliating loan in 1948 was negotiated, and Bretton woods installed the dollar standard – though counterproductive revaluations of the pound did continue throughout the fifties and even into the sixties. The British Empire was not defeated on the battlefield but in the board room.
 
 

b. War: Palestine and Greece

In 1945 Britons had spend six very long years enduring near famine, rationing, aerial bombardment, and death. Consequently when 1946 revealed that overt imperialism implied continuing war in Palestine, (zionist jewish terrorism), and Greece (a communist civil war) , and potentially in India, Britain chose to decolonize as quickly and peacefully as possible – particularly given its' poor financial position. This was definitively the case after the Suez debacle of 1956 and the end of the rebellions in Kenya and Malaya.
 
 

b. Unlike France Britain quickly negotiated and settled insurgencies in its former colonies

These facts explain why Britain negotiated peace rather quickly in both India and Palestine. It also helps explain why in the two major guerilla warfare challenges to British rule during the 1950s – Malaya and Kenya – Britain chose to annoint local leaders and leave, hoping that the democracies left to govern would endure (and in both cases they did).

The cost of attempting to maintain colonial rule under the tutelage model of gradual transfer of power to stable democratic elites appears however to have outweighed the benefits accruing either in resource extraction, prestige, or strategic position.
 
 

2. Second Phase: Realising that creating liberal democracies would be both expensive and uncertain Britain decolonized most rapidly in the least developed countries (1960 on)

If British imperialism in the 1950s still tried, whatever the cost in lives and treasure, to establish stable democratic succesor regimes, this policy was abandoned in the 1960s. In fairness one should add that the regions decolonized in the 1960s were generally poorer and more recently colonized and thus had less means and time to adapt or adopt western values of liberal democracy (assuming such values are democratic and should be replicated, both of which were contested by communists and persons in the third world). While Britain did not "write off" its African "investment" quite as nonchalantly as the United States, Britain realised that any cost-benefit analysis would reveal that colonialism was no source of revenue, or influence, or even prestige to the metropole. Benigne abandonment is an accurate description of British decolonialisation, with the notable exception of Rhodesia and South Africa, where, like India, generations of British and Dutch settlers had and have economic interests and personal attachments to the land. Decolonisation in Southern Africa consisted in bilateral (South Africa) or Unilateral (Rhodesia) declarations of independance. Thus the history of the end of Apartheid in British southern africa is in fact the history of local settler elites, which explains the protracted and bloody nature of decolonization in this region.

In all events by 1973 all that was left of the world’s greatest empire were a few islands, desperate settlers, and neofascist dreamers. In an era of global communications and post industrial production this mix, while sufficient to maintain european rule in africa for as long as 300 years was simply anachronistic. More effective and more subtle methods of exploitation were available and have been implemented.
 
 

3 .Balance Sheet of British Imperialism -
Paradoxically British success allowed British imperialists to believe themselves still a global power - despite Bretton Woods.

In our assesment of British imperialism and decolonisation the assymetry of French and British decolonisation explains why France turned all its energy to Europe quite early on, whereas Britain fooled itself all the way to the Falklands into believing itself a global empire – despite Bretton woods.

This is partly because due to its level of technological development, its allies (Canada, the US, Australia, and even New Zealand) Britain could believe it had an alterantive to Europe. Further the commonwealth and la francophonie do assure a certain limited global influence for both these states ruling classes. However despite a glorious history, solid institutions, and technological parity, both France and Britain pale in comparison with the United States in terms of global power. Further common ideology – liberal democracy and free market capitalism – explains why despite trading rivalries the odds of an interimperialist war are in fact quite low – if not unthinkable thanks to the magic of nuclear fission.

II. POST IMPERIALISM OR NEOCOLONIALISM

How did Britain and France react to their newfound status as former Empires?

Having briefly illustrated the decline and fall of the British and French empires we can now ask ourselves how Britain and France reacted to their newfound status? Again, we witness asymmetry: Britain refused to admit that it was no longer the global power, or even a global power. France on the other hand accepted its limited extra european horizons and thus concentrated its energies on Europe.
 
 

A. British Reaction: Confusion and Denial

1. Confusion: Suez War of 1956

Aside from constant attempts to shore up the value of the pound, even as late as the early 1970s, Britain’s first reaction to decolonialisation was to attempt to reassert itself, in tandem with France, in the Suez War of 1956. This example of Franco-British military cooperation ended in fiasco; Britain and France simultaneously alienated both the United States and Russia – no mean feat. The French reaction was militant Gaulism, eventually culminating in the V° republic and withdrawl from NATO. Britain, in contrast, attempted to withdraw into the cocoon, not of "splendid isolationism" but of "the special relationship".
 
 

2. Denial: 1956-1974

The period of British foreign policy between Suez and accession to the EC in 1974 – only after a humiliating French rebuff – can best be described as denial leading to isolation.

The British ruling elite, unlike the French, refused to swallow the bitter truth and thus ignored Europe for a generation. This assymetrety explains the different rôle and attitude of these two states in the EU. For 20 years the British government chose to ignore reality and focus on cozy romantic dreams of being a "second Greece – culture, beauty, and civilization – to the virile new Rome". This vision, whether sickening or romantic, can be simply described as ignoring reality leading to ineffective policy. Britains attempt to maintain an "economy class" was predicated on unrealistic presumptions as to Britain’s ability to influence the United States and former British colonies. Unrealistic policy presumptions prevented the elaboration of a coherent long range vision. As a result, Britain not only failed to prevent European unification – which had been the very definition of British foreign policy since Elizabeth I, she was herself isolated and eventually forced to practically beg to be admitted into a Europe which was already formed to achieve the goal of a federal Europe – something which no British politician would admit, which no British citizen desires, and yet which is nevertheless the case. Whether one is pro-federal Europe is irrelevant to the question of whether Europe is intended to become a federal state – for such clearly is the case, though many obstacles obviously must be first surmounted, such as petty nationalism, or common sense, depending on which side of the federalism debate one is on.
 
 

B. French Reaction: Cynical Machiavellianism

The refusal of the British government, and even of individual Britons, to see reality as it is rather than as they wished it to be, led to the failure of British foreign policy to either forge a confederal commonwealth and also to permitting Pitt’s nightmare. Again the pattern of assymetry appears: British foreign policy from 1956 to 1974 was a complete failure both at restructuring the empire into a meaningful foreign policy entity and preventing the emergence of a federalist Europe. In contrast French foreign policy, despite being thrashed in Algeria and Indochina could not have been more wildly succesful.
 
 

1. European Policy

French foreign policy in the V° republic has quite correctly placed Europe first. Paradoxically, losing its empire may have been the best thing to have happened. Fewer expenses, less embarrasing realities to explain or justify, and most important, a correct prioritization of interests. Stripped of Empire France realized that the future was in Europe, and more particularly in an alliance with Germany that would link French diplomatic acumen and military prowess with the German economic technological and economic motor. This policy allowed France to secure its eastern border, to articulate an alternative to bipolar politics, and most importantly to shape European policies and institutions in ways which would favor France. Because of France’s total commitment to Europe, anything which helps France necessarily helps Europe, and most things which help Europe help France as well. The remaining French overseas posessions are integrated into the Union, and most former French colonies enjoy preferential tarrifs through the Yaounde-Lomé-Cotonou agreements. Britain would have loved to have been able to maintain preferential tarrifs for the commonwealth – but was unable to do so.

Having exposed the interimperialist rivalries between France, Britain, and divided Germany, we are now able to explore how the Younde-Lomé-Cotonou arrangements favor France through recreating colonialism extracting more resources, at lower cost, and with less public criticism.
 
 

2. African Policy

French African policy has been to link French foreign policy in Africa, when possible, to Europe. Thus the accords between the EU and the ACP have been in fact shells for recreation of the French colonial system - and whenever possible to extend that system to other former colonies of member states.

Naturally a "maximalist" EU foreign policy would actively seek such fusion of former colonies and former colonizers in a bilateral relationship. However such rationalization requires presuming that inter imperialist rivalries can be harmonised under the European roof – which is not at all certain. Even if different historical rivalries are succesfully squelched, the problem remains that France, as the only committed European partner with a surviving empire is also the only power that can so unabashadly advocate the establishment of a European exclusive economic area with the ACP states – all the while presenting it as a shield against US world domination.

Just as the government of France recognized that French colonialism was no longer economically feasible, it also recognized that colonialism was no longer morally acceptable. First world claims to be the bearer of civilization to the poor backward third world rang hollow after the two greatest bloodbaths in world history.

However if the French government recognized that overt colonialism was no longer acceptable it also saw that the same ends – resource and labor extraction at lowest possible prices – could be achieved with more subtle means.

Hegemony has been always predicated on two policies: divide and rule, and carrot-and-stick. French necolonial policy, unsurprisingly, features both. What is unique about the French neo-imperialism hegemony in Africa is that it was forged through a series of bilateral and multilateral security and aid treaties. Thus French neo-imperialism is both formally obvious and politically invisible, partly since most french client states are so poor. The result is that each aspect of French neo-imperialism reinforces the others in policies which are cynical and realistic and efficacious.
 
 

a. Military Security (sticks)

1. Treaty authorisation of intervention

French neoimperial interventions in Africa are in fact by and large authorized and legal under international law. Essentially, as a precondition to aid, France concludes treaties with former Francophone colonies authorizing French intervention in case of emergency

2. Maintenance of advisors, prepositioned equipment, and airfields throughout former French West Africa

The actual level of forces committed to Africa is quite impressive. Nearly 10000 French soldiers and advisers are constantly present in Africa with another ten thousand soldiers soldiers, sailors, and airmen stationed in Southern France. Not only soldiers, but also airfields, and prepositioned equipement are all in place to allow rapid French intervention. France is clearly the most committed Western power in Africa, with the possible exception of South Africa.

3. Droit de l'ingérance

As well as developing treaty justifications for French intervention to topple or defend ist current "favorite" government (or opposition party) France has also quietly but consistently argued in favor of the right of humanitarian intervention. Under this right, which was nowhere present in prewar customary international law, one state may violate the sovereignty of another when the internal affairs of that state become ungovernable. A detailed analysis of the potential uses and abuses of such a doctrine are beyond the object of this paper. Suffice it to say that any "right" of humanitarian intervention provides a blank check for any imperialist power to invade any third world country at any time since most third world countries are ill governed - if they are governed at all.

b. Economic Stability (carrots)

The military "stick" of neocolonialism is the threat – or promise – of military intervention. The economic "carrot" is the ability to participate in the Zone France and the Cotonou agreements.

1. Zone Franc

The zone franc is nothing more or less than an economic regime which "pegs" the value of a countries currency to that of the french franc. The advantage of such a system to the third world state is that it guarantees that ist currency will in fact be valued outside ist borders, and also guarantees that the interest rates on ist loans will not include accelleration clauses or increases in interest rates on loans. Further while currency devaluation is frustrating in the short term, currency stability is a necessary precondition to economic development.

The advantage to France of the zone franc is mostly prestige, though being able to value local transactions in a familiar currency (100 francs cfa = 1 ff) and being able at least in theory to squeeze or expand credit when desired allows some flexibility in french instruments of control.

2. Lomé

When we consider the french neocolonial regime we should also understand that it could, in theory, be extended to other ACP states. For example, former Belgian congo does participate in the French system, as could other former colonies. The fact that participation in Cotonou, the zone franc, and bilateral security accords is voluntary and open to new members explains the potential of this system to allow France, acting within europe, to eventually, via the EU, dominate the ACP, not only economically but also politically. Thus the ACP would be seen as the outermost ring of the community.

This regime is, like any system of "carrot and stick" is not entirely evil;

The regime of semiplanned economics offered by Sysmin and Stabex might actually be preferable to capitalism à l’americain – which is currently the only other alternative. However seeing democratic requirements, with no condition of proportionality to economic development, as anything other than an open invitation and excuse for neoimperialist predation at will is as unrealistic as British dreams of global empire in the 1950s.
 

3. Debt

One of the other salient features of french neo-colonial policy had been, until recently, a support of state centred models of governance and a rejection of the IMF institutions. French vassal states, while subjec to the occasional coup d’état and french intervention were at least spared the burden of crushing foreign debt. With the end of the cold war this has begun to change as the logical of privatisation and "efficiency" supports extracting more resources at ever lower prices.
 
 

c. Mechanics of power – Divide and Rule
 

As we explained, the carrot and stick approach works through linking aid and security. Linking trade and military rights of access is not the only element of french neocolonial policy. Divide and rule consists in allowing different tribes in africa to fight each other with French (or British, or American, or Roman) imperialists acting as "kingmaker". African post colonial boundaries are virtually identical to the colonial boundaries and are frozen in place by the OAU. Consequently, no African state is a nation state. At best several nationalities will reside within the same artificially imposed boundaries, generally dating from the Berlin accords. At worst, several nations will share two or more countries leading to convoluted and byzantine politics which make the balkans seem relatively tame, when one considers that several first world powers are or were or will be vying for control of these different nations and the discongruent artificial states within which political goals must be expressed.

The worst and most example of the breakdown of the policy of "divide and rule" of diferent nations living within artificial states is of course Rwanda – though Uganda, and Biafra/Nigeria were also quite bad. In Rwanda, france had for several decades played each tribe off against the other, favoring whichever was capable of forming a government - a machiavellian darwinism if you will. After the cold war, the US has tried, rather unsuccesfully, to destabilize French control over West Africa: Such control, while useful during the cold war is not helpful in the post cold war. In fact Rwanda shows how imperialism has mutated and emerged from the cold war as neoimperialism.

In any event the result of Franco-American rivalry and French divisio et impero was many, many dead persons – all of whom were black, all of whom were poor, and none of whom needed to die.

Such is the reality of imperialism, but to ignore it will not make it go away.
 
 

3. Conclusion

Our study of French foreign policy has shown that French policy towards africa can be accurately portrayed as cynical and machiavellian. Such policies are however realistic. Interimperialist rivalry, whether overtly imperialist (1490-1919) or covertly imperialist (1946- present).

That criticism however could also be leveled at the United States and Britain – however the French are perhaps more adept at the subtle use of influence and knowing when to abandon power and adopt influence. Imperialism is certainly a dirty game. The French play it rather succesfully, though if we consider the US relationship with Latin America we discern that the US plays this game as well and perhaps not as nicely.

If all great powers play imperialism, then the challenge facing transformationalist theories of foreign policy is determining methods to shift out of the zero sum game of imperialism toward the positive sum game of mutual sustainable developmemnt - the subject of the last section of this paper.
 
 

III. What can Africa do in the face of neocolonialism?

In the first two sections of this paper we have attempted to outline decolonisation and the neocolonial regimes which have replaced overt colonizations. However pointing out the exploitation of cheap labor and raw materials without offering concrete developement plans is inadequate. Developing Africa should in fact be an objective of Europe if only for the cynical reason that as the third world grows prosperous fewer persons in the third world will seek to emigrate to Europe.

A. Definition of the Problem:

1. Resource and Labor Extraction

The central problem facing the third world is the extraction below cost of labor and raw materials. Robbed of capital, africa cannot purchase the tools it needs to escape single export item dependance. The third world generally and africa in particular, needs to develop indiginous industries, whether private or public, in order to escape from dependancy and indebtedness.

a. Direct Resource and Labor Extraction

Exploitation occurs in three varieties: low wages for dirty and dangerous work. Low prices paid for raw materials. And economic dependance on export items, mainly one, for example, coffee or cocoa or minerals. This type of exploitation can be considered "direct".

b. Indirect Resource and Labor Extraction - Debt

Exploitation of the third world is also indirect. The most clear example of exploitation is over indebtedness. What are the casues of over indebtedness.

i. Over-indebtedness is a result of a presumption of continuing cheap oil in 1970s

The first cause of overindebtedness was the fact that because of reconstruction the world economy from 1950 to 1970 was almost always in expansion. Thus in the 1970s economists presumed expansion would continue, and lent money accordingly. However not only did economic expansion slow down, in some economies, notably in Africa, the economy actually contracted. 1974 to 1982 were particularly bad years, though even after 1982 was still rough in many parts of the non-English speaking world, and even the English speaking world suffered a recession in 1992.

If debt in the early to mid 1970s was fueled by inaccurate expectations of general prosperity, debt in the late 70s and early 80s was fueled by erroneous presumptions of particular prosperity due to oil speculations. Mexico, Venezuela, and any other state which was actually or potentially petroleum blessed state could borrow as much money as it wanted, and many did. Naturally some states which counted on petroleum wealth were disappointed to discover that either no oil or only expensive oil was available. When the price of oil dropped again in the mid 1980s – as a result of sales made to fund the Iran-Iraq war, countries which had gone into debt expecting oil profits were suddenly in over their heads.

ii. Economic failure is also a result of the application of Keyne's inflationary and improductive economic theories

One more cause of economic dislocation of the third world was mistaken keynessien economic presumption. Keynes teaches, simplified, that a government can tax and spend ist way out of recession, and that inflation can be used to stimulate economic growth. These presumptions, however rosy, were in fact thoroughly refuted by the empirical experience of the early 1970s where economic stagnation, high unemployment, and inflation occurred simultataneously – thoroughly contradicting Keynes theory. Keynesian economics continued however to be applied, even in the first world as late as the early 1980s and is still, despite obvious flaws, preached as a "solution" to third world debt. Unfortunately nothing could be further from the truth, since debt repudiation by inflation leads to capital flight and economic failure.

iii. Debt indexation has erased any beneficial effect of inflation for debtors

One of the advantages of having a currency is being able to revalue it – which allows a debtor to avoid repaying debts. However such a policy also guarantees that no lender will lend to such a debtor. However to prevent states from avoiding debts through inflation, currencies are "pegged" to first world currencies, and debts are indexed to reflect inflation – both policies which were not done, and may not have been necessary, during the reconstruction economy of 1950 to 1970. Both policies, while underwriting exploitation through debt, also guarantee new capital and thus greater production. In other words, stable currencies, free of inflation and free of the risk of natioanlisation attract foreign capital, leading to some growth. Of course the ideal situation is to rely on domestic capital, but even in such a case stable currencies and guaranties against expropriation help encourage capital formation.
 

2. Political Instability

a. Problem

As well as guaranteeing economic stability, third world regimes must also guarantee political stability. Third world regimes often face high rates of crime, as well as the real risk of coups and revolutions.
 
 

b. Solution

In order to combat these problems authoritarian regimes are required. This can of course lead to tyranny, but a well ordered tyranny is better than starvation – which is what much of Africa currently faces. Whether a despotic and ill ordered tyranny is worse than starvation is moot, since both are bad. In other words the risk that the necessary authoritarianism to create political stability may lead to tyranny is no argument where the economy is at subsistence or even starvation. Political security and democracy are not positively correlated, however a minimum of security and material well being is a necessary precondition to meaningful democracy. Any externally imposed or guaranteed requirement of democracy in the third world must be itself conditioned on the proportionality of those guarantees to the economic well being and physical security since liberal democracy means nothing in the face of starvation.
 

B: Solution of the Problem:

1. Physical security is a necessary precondition to capital accumulation

Political security has been shown as a necessary precondition to economic security and democracy and thus our justification for supporting authoritarian regimes when the alternative is starvation or civil war. How can a state which is politically secure guarantee its economic well being?

Third world states must, to attract foreign capital, and generate domestic capital, renounce nationalisations, and honor their debts through repayment. They must also maintain stable non-inflationary currencies, through fixed exchange rates to known stable currencies.

These policies which are both authoritarian and capitalist are also realistic. While state models of economic planning are also possible in the current international context the few planned economies remaining – North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba, all face the risk of isolation and ostracism. Consequently no third world country can responsably advocate revolutionary politics. Such politics may be viscerally satisfying in the face of the injustice of exploitation whether through over-lending, or underpaying workers or providers of raw materials. However they will not lead, at least at present, to a viable alternative (planned economy) and would probably be crushed, as happened to Chile.
 

2. Capital accumulation is a necessary precondition to ending poverty

If we identify domestic capital formation as being the most realistic policy to escape exploitation, then we should detail that such capital can be generated through savings, reinvestment of local capital into local business, and transitioning from single resource economies to light industrial economies. Such politicsl can be encouraged, not only through responsable monetary policies, but also through rational fiscal programs and balanced budgets. Creating the expectation not only of physical security but also of respect for property will attract investment, but more importantly will also encourage the formation of local capital through savings and reinvestment. While forced savings and reinvestment can be impelled in a planned economy, and at higher rates than in unplanned economies, the risks facing any planned economy in the third world in the face of a monolithic first world capitalist bloc are simply not responsable. While such programs might have been workable in the 1970s they are today not possible, at least not realistically.
 

IV: Conclusion

To conclude we have shown how the inter-imperialist rivalry between France and Britain led to a system wherein France can use the cloak of the European Union to cover its neocolonial politics in the ACP states, notably in Africa. We have also shown the realpolitik mechanics of neocolnialism, and have tried to show politics and policies which will help African states to attract and generate the capital needed to create local industries in order to escape resource dependance. That such politics of semi planned industrial growth through responsable monetary (0 inflation), fiscal (favor investment, disfavor luxury consumption) and budgetary policies (balanced budgets) will in the medium term allow third world states to escape from debtm, resource and labor exploitation can be seen in the examples of resource poor economies such as South Korea, China, Phillipines, Malaysia, and Taiwan. All of these countries succesfully launched semi planned industrial policies on the basis of fiscal, monetary, and budgetary responsability, including for example low interest government loans, and investment incentives. However to even be able to launch such policies a minimum of physical security is necessary. If African borders cannot be redrawn to reflect tribal divisions to avoid the "checkerboard effect" of nations straddling boundaries then at least civil peace must be guaranteed. Sadly even this is lacking in many African states. Africa has been clearly abandoned by the United States, and possibly Britain. Of western powers, France is the most committed too Africa. It will be ironic if french neoimperialism creates the conditions for African development, however such is currently the most likely case.