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THE  EUROCORPS:  A EUROPEAN ARMY?

Eric Engle


Table of Contents:

Abstract:

I. State Theory: Dichotomies

A. Terminology: The power/Influence dichotomy

B. Presuppositions as to the nature of interstate relations

C. Methodological Dichotomies

II. EUROPES FOREIGN POLICY

III. Challenges facing Europes Common Defense Policy

IV. Conclusion

NOTES

BIBLIOGRAPHY



Abstract:

This paper briefly explores the possibility and limitations of a common European foreign and security policy (CFSP). It concludes that, contrary to the recieved wisdom, a the material basis for a viable CFSP does in fact already exist due to national security policies such as the French Force d'Action Rapide (FAR), and similar rapid reaction forces. However while the material base needed for a CFSP does exist, the political unity and will to employ such forces does not yet exist. However as time passes the possibility of a viable unified CFSP will increase as the functionalist processes of the EU gradually transform the potential of an EU CFSP into reality.


I. State Theory: Dichotomies

The study of foreign policy - and possibly any other field of social science - can be approached from a dialectical perspective. This method, employed bopth by Aristotle in epistemology, and Marx in historical materialism, consists in breaking objects into their constituent parts (analysis) to determine axes of polar opposition (dichotomies). These polar oppositions may in turn be studied considered as either in absolute opposition or relative opposition relative or absolute (Nietzche, Beyond Good and Evil; Mao On Contradiction).

In epistemology this approach brings out two main poles: wholism/atomism and realism/nominalism. Both these poles have influenced and continue to influence the study of international relations. Often, though not necessarily, wholism and realism are presented as mutually reinforcing and in opposition to the linkage - which again, is contingent, of atoimism and nominalism.

Our approach however is somewhat unique in that we combine nominalism and wholism.

As this paper is about the study of politics and not epistemology we shall presume as an a priori "given" the given the nominalist-wholist position. Restated, epistemological questions are presumed as either self evident, or more correctly as hypotheses for this paper - though these hypotheses can be defended elsewhere they are outside the scope of this paper.

The first dichotomy we shall explore then is the most fundamental, that of realism and transformationalism. We shall adopt a guarded transformationalist position, influenced when necessary by a prudent dose of realism. This methodology can be criticized in theoretical terms as an attempt to subsume absolute opposites. Our position however is that any conceptual opposition between realism and transformationism is only relative. While absolute opposites are necessarily mutually exclusive, relative oppositions can be synthesized (Mao, On Contradiction). This synthesis can also be defended as being practically necessary to permit workable solutions to real problems. Because of our materialist presumptions a conflict between empirical reality and theory must be resolved through the correction of theory to fit reality and not the opposite.
 

A. Terminology: The power/Influence dichotomy

1. Power

Power is the material capacity to act, and could be compared to potence or impetus. It is the physical capacity to compel others to conform . Influence is the capacity to persuade or disuade others to act or refrain to acting.

2. Influence

While state power is still directly correlated to military force, state influence is only weakly correlated to military power. Thus it is possible for a militarily „"strong"" state to be nevertheless powerless; for example, America with respect to Vietnam in the early 1970s. It is equally possible for a „"weak"" state to exercise it s will, to coerce, cajole, or implore, and this despite a relative absence of material forces of compulsion. The example of France with respect to the European Union since 1956, for example.

3. Conflicts: Positive Sum and Zero Sum

Conflict is the existence of separate wills seeking opposing objectives and thus trying to influence or overpower each other.

While all interactions feature relative conflict, this relative conflict is more often than not positive sum. Certainly some conflicts are zero sum, and it is in exactly that case - zero sum conflicts - that power is exerted rather than influence. However in the case of relative positive sum conflicts while power may have some relevance, influence is much more important. In other words „"power"" or „"force"" corresponds more closely to zero sum relations, whereas influence corresponds more directly with positive sum situations.

These relations between power and influence and their rôle in letting Europe shed the skin of it s tragic past to move forward to a brighter future explain why we must consider questions of arms.
 

B. Presuppositions as to the nature of interstate relations

1. Realism

Realism asserts that material force is the sine qua non of state power, and the ultimate arbiter of relations between states. The realist thesis may be dismal, seeing the interstate arena as a hobbesian war of all against all. However it is pragmatic, and at least until 1945 seemed a valid enough description of state relations. To this transformationalists argue that atomic weapons, by making war unthinkable, changed forever the relations among the great powers. To an extent they are correct; the global peace since 1945 - ever punctuated, including after the cold war, by brushfire wars in the third world - would be most accurately called „"pax atomica"". If realist theories of states as as reactive isolats has become outmoded, at least in the first world, this transformation is nevertheless built in the shadow of nuclear war.

Realism is a pragmatic theory of international relations. It argues that states, like economic actors, are rational power maximizers, seeking their own self interest in an essentially zero sum world (wherein if A wins B loses and vice verse). This vision can be critiqued as stilted and tending to generate conflict or defended as being practical. Variants of this theory, such as neo-realism or even neo-liberalism do exist with nuanced differences,(1) however in essence the theoretical core of this concept is the state as rational power maximizer.

Realist thinking dominate the Westphalian era of international relations (1680-1990). However even since the second world war the realist paradigm of zero sum conflict between power maximizing states has been under strain from other models, (2)

generally subsumed under the title "transformationalist" which we shall now examine.
 

2. Transformationism

Transformationalism is the theory that state relations today are more and more based on mutual trust and characterized less and less by the threat or use of force. Rather than seeing isolated states engaged in balance of power manipulative juggling, transformative theories propose interdependant states seeking to act in their mutual interest.(3)
 

a. Disintigration and Subsumation of the State: a double challenge

At the same time as the emergence of a post-Westphalian world order - in response to the tragedy of the mass slaughter in as many generations of millions of persons - has forced the questions of transformation and realism to the fore, we are also confronted by the erasure and subsumation of the nation state into super and sub national entities. If the EU is the best (and not the only!) example of the transformationist thesis, it is also, and more quietly, evidence of the disintegration of the territorially based sovereign nation state as sole and ultimate object of international law and citizen obedience. Euro sceptics are correct to charge the EU with undermining the nation state. However the Euro sceptics also fail to recognize that the EU while undermining the nation state thereby guarantees European peace. By disassociating the zero sum aspects of the nation - security - from it s positive sum aspects - trade - tthe EU has helped to reduce the risk of a third inter European civil war. The Euro sceptic then correctly sees Europe as a threat to familiar and democratic institutions, but all too often fails to understand the necessity of transforming those beloved familiar institutions - not only to prevent another continental catastophry, but also to allow the New Europe to surpass itself. The question among forward thinkers is not „"whether Europe?"" but „"wither europe?"" - how shall Europe whither the outmoded instrumentalities of mass destruction? And wither goes Europe - to a bright future of open doors and friendly new faces, or to a closed sad and gray world of fear and hate.
 

b. Rejection of transformationalist theses

Our position is prudently transformationist. We attempt a frankly pragmatic synthesis of realism in the zero sum arena of "security" but adopt an open textured transformationalist theory in the positive sum arena of "trade". (4) Our rejection of realism (5) is not wholesale but qualified. We recognize the contribution, and indeed the opportunities offered by a transformationalist perspective, we also recognize it s pragmatic limits.
 

c. Contemporary World Facts Supporting our Position

As prudent transformationists, we recognize that the traditional apparatus of the Westphalian state system is now largely outmoded. Instant global communication has sealed the fate of the nation state. No tribalist opposition, no matter how virulent, can resist the technological reality that any idea can move anywhere on this planet instantly. Capital is only slightly less mobile; even persons are able to move about so quickly that it is not irrealistic to say that one may move from any major city on this planet to any other major city in one day. These facts explain why the territorial sovereign nation state is increasingly irrelevant, and why traditional analyses are incomplete. (6) These facts also explain why stateless multinational companies, and even individual natural persons, are so much more flexible and thus suited to the new order.

This new order is historically unique, though it does bear some resemblance to the legal order of the Italian trading states and the Hanseatic League during of the early renaissance: islands of state sovereignty in an ocean of traders who are at best indifferent and at worst contemptuous of the sovereigns claim to absolute power of life and death over every person and object in the state‘'s territorium.

There is however a significant differnce: institutions at the supernational level today claim authority and power to legislate over whole continents (EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR) or even the entire planet, e.g. the WTO and UN. (7).

These institutions are ofhowever course thoroughly undemocratic.
 

C. Methodological Dichotomies

1. Structuralism / Functionalism

Structuralism argues that institutions should be understood via the institutions that compose them. In contrast, functionalism argues that institutions should be understood in terms of the goals that that they seek to achieve. The European Union has from it s inception been predicated upon a functionalist methodology, for pragmatic reasons. To be blunt, Europeans would never accept, in 1950, the creation of a European federal state; further in 1950 such would have been materially impossible since the institutions required for governing millions of people in many different geographic and ethno-linguistic areas would be simply impossible. Consequently European integration has always sought to inexorably but slowly move from atomistic nation states to an "ever closer union" concluding eventually but inevitably in a federal state. This then explains our interest in the rôle of security and foreign policy in the construction of the european polity. Such a policy, while hopefully purely defensive, is also a necessary part of achieving the independance of Europe from American tutelage.

2. Functionalism/Neo-Functionalism and Spillover

Thus the rôle and mission of the Eurocorps must be determined in function of maintaining the security and independance of Europeans. Whether Europe's army eventually becomes capable of out-of-area operations will depend on the success of the Union as it evolves towards a democratic and federal state.
 

II. EUROPES FOREIGN POLICY

Of the transnational organisations, the EU is the most democratic. Nevertheless the mechanisms of Brussels remain, by and large, administrative and appointive rather than democratic. The European Parliament wields little real power. That the EU suffers from democratic deficit is a well known fact. The implication of this fact is that Europe cannot conduct military operations because such would lack legitimacy. Popular support is a necessary precondition to conducting war, at least in democracies. Consequently the EU cannot, and should not, seek to conduct foreign military interventions - though it s member states can and should since the EU simply cannot.

Because of democratic deficit, the EU‘'s foreign policy has been at best merely the sum of the fforeign policy of it s member states, (8) or at worst a "myth"(9). Until recently it was not unusual to argue that the EU did not have a foreign policy (10). Consequently our analysis of the Eurocorps shall be based on the presupposition that any out of area operations are to be undertaken multilaterally by member states in cooperation with each other, rather than unilaterally by the Union.

Consequently our analysis of the Eurocorps shall be based on the presupposition that any out of area operations are to be undertaken multilaterally by member states in cooperation with each other, rather than unilaterally by the Union.
 

A. CFSP Under Maastricht

The CFSP is not a common foreign policy in the sense prescribed by the Treaty of Maastricht. According to the Treaty, the CFSP shall be ‘'supported actively and unreservedly by its Member States in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity‘'. Further, the CFSP is supposed to cover ‘'all areas of foreign and security policy‘'. It would be naive to pretend other than that national foreign policies remain strong and that reaching a consensus, in particular in situations of crisis which require rapid responses, remains difficult. Identifying shared interests and reconciling different national

foreign policy traditions is a challenge. Thus, this literature does not confirm traditional neo-functionalist assumptions about integration.

B. Existing Defense Structures

Perhaps the biggest challenge to the EU is the success of the transatlantic institutions which helped maintain European peace during 40 years.

1. NATO

NATO has been described as the world's most succesful defensive alliance. In so far as NATO has successfully transformed itself from cold-war defensive barrier to forum for transatlantic security (10) able to react in the face of crises (11) with cogent effective policies, it has become a mixed blessing. A blessing on the one hand for dissuading conflict and assuaging fears. A curse in so far as its' very success explains in part – though not at all exclusively – why Europe is having such difficulty finding a common voice. European foreign policy has in some senses been a victim of NATOs success – and again this may be as well, since NATO is not currently tasked with third world intervention.

The dominance of NATO is partly due to history. Europe did try to establish the European Defence Community in the 1950s.(12) This failed however due foreign policy differences which stemmed from, and remained anchored to, the nation state. The irony is that the nation state system set up by the Treaty of Westphalia in the 1600s did prevent the universalist religious wars which led to it s establishment. However it eventually bred even bloodier nationalist wars based not on universal religion but on the desire for market share. Europe risks to repeat this experience, replacing the Westphalian state system with a Continental System which would lead to wars for markets. This explains the necessity of effective security policies, and also why NATO is a mixed blessing.

2. WEU

Current efforts to revive the EDC revolve around the WEU (Western European Union). The WEU does include states which are not members of the EU. In 1992 the EU issued the Petersberg declaration, (13) however the limits to common foreign policy and on the EuroCorps explain the incapacity to transform this declaration into reality.

3. The EuroCorps

The common foreign and security policy, if it exists (leaving aside the question whether it should exist) must, like any such policy rest ultimately upon military force. In theory at least Europe does have the means to conduct out-of-area military operations.

The Eurocorps is to consist of a mechanised and light force.(14) The mechanised unit is intended for sustained middle term operations, for example in ex-Yugoslavia. The light force is intended for rapid intervention, possibly in Africa or in order to prepare the ground for the mechanised force.
 

C. Available Forces

Whatever its final organisation it is clear that the Eurocorps is essentially a franco-german joint army.(15) To that extent it represents the mutual commitment of the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany to the common European future. The Eurocorps is responsable principally to the WEU, (16) though it would be possible for the Eurocorps to be integrated into NATO operations - provided the French government is more willing to cooperate with the Anglo-Americans - which at least under De Gaulle was not the case. Britain has agreed to commit 20,000 troops to the new force, to be drawn mostly from its Nato Rapid Reaction Force. France is expected to come up with a similar number. Germany has offered 18,000 and Spain 6,000. The operating language will be English. (17)

The Eurocorps consists of the following military units:

1. The EUROCORPS (European Corps)
2. The Multinational Division (Central)
3. The UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force
4. The EUROFOR
5. The EUROMARFOR (European Maritime Force)
6. The Headquarters of the 1st German-Netherlands Corps
7. The Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (18)

Which can be broken down into:The European Corps (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain), with 80,000 men at full strength.  The Anglo-Dutch Amphibious Force, a rapidly deployable landing force of about 6,000 men.  The Multinational Division Centre (Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, UK) with two airborne and two airmobile brigades; The Rapid Deployment Euroforce (Eurofor with units from France, Italy, Portugal and Spain) consisting of easily deployable light forces at division level and operating under the control of an interministerial committee (CIMIN);

Euromarfor (France, Italy, Portugal, Spain), a non-standing, pre-configured and multinational maritime force with both maritime and amphibious capabilities;

The 1st German-Netherlands Corps: its Corps HQ in Münster which could provide support in the planning and preparation appropriate command and control assets;

The Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force, a pre-structured, non-permanent force whose national amphibious components would retain their operational and organic chains of command; a small nucleus of officers being the only permanent element.(19)
 

III. Challenges facing Europes Common Defense Policy

A. Absence of satellite intelligence and heavy lift

This author is of the opinion that Europe does posess the needed infrastructure to deploy the Eurocorps, particularly within Europe. While it is true that the EU is less well equipped than the US in terms of transport, and satellites, it is also true that what it does have is sufficient: France for example maintains 10,000 military personnel  in Africa, with another 10,000 rapidly deployable via a network of airfields, ports, prepositioned supplies and forward bases. France also has Ariane launchers and satellites. Thus claiming Europe does not have the necessary means is essentially untrue. Whether Europe has the will to pay the costs of such deployments, and the capacity to develop common policies is questionable. Even more questionable is whether such policies would have the popular support needed for long term out of area operations, because of "democratic deficit". However in material terms, Europe does have, with reserve forces, merchant marine, and national airlines, the means to deploy significant military force – even for extended periods of time, even outside of Europe. Whether such is desirable is another question.(20)

B. Absence of unified command

Perhaps the biggest difficulty facing the CFSP – which is after all the guiding force which shall direct the EuroCorps – is the absence of unity.  This lack of unity can be improved somewhat by by strengthening the role of the European Commission in foreign policy. (21)  However democratic deficit severely undermines committing European's to fight wars, even for noble reasons, even as close to the EU as ex-Yugoslavia. Without real democratic input, European foreign policy, at least in security matters, would lack the necessary legitimacy for coherent, extended, out of area operations. That may be just as well.

European disunity in foreign policy is not however the traditional "inward looking" non-elites versus  "outward looking" elites: opposition to the creation of a federal Europe and more particularly to a federal European army is one of the few areas in the european project where even elites are divided as to what should be done: despite the fact that in the end the children of elites are not going to be killed for oil, and despite the common economic interest of Europe's elites in maintaining a favorable business climate, the elites of Europe have not yet agreed as to how to elaborate mechanisms for coherent realpolitik at the level of the community – though individual European states, notably France, and England, do succeed in maintaining domestic legitimacy to drive national foreign policies. This rather than availability of men and materielle is why one still has grounds for scepticism as to the reality of a European army - though that scepticism will be less justified with time as Europe moves toward its "ever closer union".

C. Political Disunity (22)

1. Britain

As one of the few governments not delegitimated by the second European civil war, Britain has always been a "reluctant European". While "Briton" and "Eurosceptic" are not synonyms, it is little secret that Britons and the British government generally oppose the idea of federal europe. Since at least 1974 the British elite has recognized that they have no choice other than Europe. However Britain has been singularly ineffectual at influencing the European project. While Britain supports a free trade area, and free movement of capital, it was less keen to accept free movement of goods, and even less willing to accept free movement of persons. It may be unfair, but it is nevertheless true, that Britain is insular both geographically and metaphorically. In sum, the inhabitants of the cold grey northern isle are ambivalent if not hostile to the idea of federal Europe. However prior to creating a real CFSP one must first create a Federal Europe. (23) Whether British insularity will overcomes Euro-optimism remains to be seen - but is also a possibility.
2. France

Whatever one may think of British reluctance to build a federal europe, it is nonetheless true that Britain has failed to  limit or direct the European project, and derives almost no symbolic benefits from the EU. Although Europe epresents the bankruptcy of British foreign policy and the incomprehension  among the British elite and non-elite at changed realities, one can say exactly the opposite about French policy towards Europe. France has quite succesfully marshalled the community to support directly or indirectly French foreign policy. So accusations of British Eurosceptics, that the EU is a Trojan horse filled with Gaullists (24) might not be too far from the truth. However that argument misses the point: favoring or disfavoring  Euro-imperialism to national-imperialism is senseless because any imperialist policy is indefensible. Further whether merely  national conceptions of the state remain realistic is now questionable.

If the EU means merely trading in the imperialism of nation-states for social imperialism  of the EU, then the errors of the last century - imperialist trade wars - will be repeated,, possibly on a grander scale and possibly with graver consequences. Neo-imperialist wars waged by third world proxies would in such a case be the ultimate proof of the bankruptcy of social imperialism.

D. Nuclear weapons

Expecting the two European nuclear powers to cooperate in their nuclear strategy is at best optimistic. Standard military policy is to plan for every contingency based not on intentions but capabilities. This planning mechanism might seem ridiculous or redundant. However it is in fact prudent, and such military planning does not reflect foreign policy. Given the level of US and British intelligence cooperation, which is quite extensive, it is unlikely that either of these powers has made calculations for war against the other. Whether or not Europe succeeds in developing a common foreign policy could depend in part on the ability of transatlantic diplomacy to develop stable mechanisms for maintaining the European peace, with or without US forces, and in the face not only of the risk of north south or east west breakdowns but also of the risk of inter-community or transatlantic breakdowns. When one compares the GNP and population of the EU and NAFTA it becomes clear that contemporary American hegemony is not an inevitability. Thus the sooner that the international system considers alternatives to the presumption  of continued American dominance the better. It may be wise to recall the presumption that the cold war division would continue inevitably, although indeed it ended surprisingly quickly.
 

E. Transatlantic relations

Another limit on European foreign policy is the fact that Anglo-French cooperation is constrained by the British-American relationship. While the US and France are ideologically aligned, and have a long history of friendship, they are nevertheless divided on a number of political and trade issues.  France has invested large resources both in maintaining ties to it s former colonies and in developing an independant arms and energy industry. French intransigence is not merely legendary, but is fully understandable given that the French government is in no way dependant upon the US. However while Britain is also independant of the United States the English speaking countries cooperate more closely on security policy with each other than with the Francophone countries (on this point one should note the real opportunity for Canadian diplomacy to smooth relations between states which are after all liberal democracies, although as culturally different as they are similar).
It is easiest to understand the difficulties of Anglo-French relations when one recognizes that while all European-enthusiasts are not French, all French elites are European enthusiasts. French policy could be summarized as "what is good for Europe is good for France, and what is good for France is probably good for Europe". This adage is not duplicitious, though it must seem like it to the British, since what is good for Europe (common agricultural policy) has not always been good for Britain (e.g. loss of the commonwealth agricultural preference).

F. The failure of the CFSP to resolve the crisis in YugoslaviaIf disunity (and Britain is not the only Eurosceptic: Austria and Finland both assert neutrality and Denmark is also "out" of the Euro) explain why the EuroCorps has only had one mission(25) it may also explain why that mission, to Yugoslavia, failed.(26) The failure of the EuroCorps to "go it alone" and demonstrate Europes capacity to solve European problems without American intervention is at least partly the result of political division within the EU. While not as humiliating as the Suez debacle of 1956, the failure of Europe to demonstrate a common policy where the basic  issues seem clear enough (seperate warring parties, bandage wounded, and build new stable democratic institutions) shows that Europe, is dependant on the US. Europe's addiction to US weapons is not because the US is so much richer or even that much better equipped. It is not. Nor is Europe's martial torpor due to US equipment that Europe lacks: Europe does have it s own sattelites and launching vehicles, as well as the transport, required by KFOR. What was lacking was not even political willpower. What was lacking was political coherence and decision making. No politician, party, nor coalition decided to to separate beligerant parties – or to leave the parties in place, and merely care for refugees. Instead vacilation and confusion coupled with cacophony to let Europe fumble "an easy one". This failure of the CFSP explains why the EuroCorps has only had one mission – although it does have the means those means also require willpower, cohesion, and popular support. In short, democratic deficit is the ultimate explanation for the failure of the EU foreign policy.
 
 

IV. Conclusion

Europe still lacks a unified foreign policy. This is because Europe's contintental institutions are thoroughly elitist, and largely immune to "Europhoria". Institutional opposition to a unitary foreign policy is also due to history, linguistic divergence, or even religious division. However because European youth are wildly enthusiastic about Europe a unified European foreign policy could eventually be attained. Europe's adults are fully aware of why Europe must consign the failed politics of it s tragic past to the history books. The common foreign policy will be probably the last step to be taken in the creation of a federal Europe. However this paper has shown that realistic steps are already being taken toward that goal, while outlining the limits which constrain the CFSP.



NOTES

1) "The classical power politics perspective has been further elaborated upon and modified into the neo-realist and neo-liberal perspectives on international relations. A central  difference with the power based theories is that from the neo-realist and neo-liberal perspectives, the different strategies of negotiation, the calculations of actors, also contribute to explain the outcome in international politics. In the older, or 'classical realist' perspectives, the focus is mostly on the power resources of actors. Negotiation strategies are usually not taken into consideration when foreign policy is analysed. Amongst themselves, neo-realists and neo-liberals disagree on the likelihood of co-operation. Both perspectives accept that the anarchical nature of the international system put particular constraints on co-operation. Yet, neo-realists consider international anarchy to represent a greater hindrance to inter-state co-ordination than the neo-liberals do. The two perspectives also disagree on whether or not states have a common interest in co-operating: the neo-realists consider states to be mostly interested in relative gains, whereas the neo-liberals stress states' interest in maximising their absolute gains."
"The Common Foreign and Security Policy: an Emerging New Voice in International Politics?"
Helene Sjursen
ARENA
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp99_34.htm#fot_5
2) "Neo-realist and neo-liberal perspectives have rarely been
applied directly to the CFSP or the EU. ...these recent theories are of limited
use. In order to highlight such issues, we need a different
perspective on international politics altogether. This
perspective takes as its starting point that the international
system is more complex than what interest based theories
assumes."
"The Common Foreign and Security Policy: an Emerging New Voice in International Politics?"
Helene Sjursen
ARENA
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp99_34.htm
3) "Reflectivism
"Most of the so-called reflectivist literature is not explicit in
identifying the driving forces in the political process. In order
to specify these, the cosmopolitan model might help by
providing an alternative model of human action. Rather than
focus exclusively on rational calculation aimed at satisfying
material self interests, it would underline the role of laws,
principles and processes of deliberation within an
institutionalised system. The intergovernmental character of
the CFSP may not then be the most important element, but
rather the quality of the processes that take place inside
them, and whether or not these can be seen as processes
aimed at coming to a shared understanding through arguing,
or simply a process of bargaining between self sustained
interests. A situation of arguing can be seen to take place in
institutions that respect the participating parties as actors
with equal rights. Thus relations within the CFSP could be
seen as based on reciprocally recognised norms, rather than
on a balance of power. "
"The Common Foreign and Security Policy: an Emerging New Voice in International Politics?"
Helene Sjursen
ARENA
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp99_34.htm
4) "Although the international system post-1989 has obviously
not transformed itself into a cosmopolitan democracy there
are elements of change in the international system that point
to an evolution in this direction. It is often argued that neither
the nation state nor the international system is what they used
to be, or what the realist perspective claimed that they were.
The privileged position of the state is challenged both
domestically and internationally. The state can no longer
control political, economic and in some cases even military
movements across national borders. The nation state is not,
either, able to draw on the same type of loyalty from
domestic actors as it has previously been able to. Actors'
loyalties will follow other logics and be defined according to
other premises than loyalty to the nation states. At the same
time, it has to relate to an increasing number of international
agreements that put constraints on its behaviour."
"The Common Foreign and Security Policy: an Emerging New Voice in International Politics?"
Helene Sjursen
ARENA
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp99_34.htm
5) Contra realism:
"Thus, rather than focus exclusively on
rational calculations aimed at satisfying material self-interests,
a cosmopolitan model would underline the role of laws,
principles and processes of deliberation within an
institutionalised system. The nation state, although legally
sovereign, is seen as woven into a complex network of
mutual dependency with other national states as well as
transnational actors and international organisations. From this
perspective the absence of a hierarchy both between actors
and issues in the international system would be important.

Military power is, in other words, not attributed a privileged
position on top of the hierarchy as it is in the realist
perspective. Military power is not seen as the ultimate arbiter
in international relations, which gives actors a particular
weight in the international system. On the contrary military
power is set alongside economic and political power."

The privileged position of the state is challenged both
domestically and internationally. The state can no longer
control political, economic and in some cases even military
movements across national borders. The nation state is not,
either, able to draw on the same type of loyalty from
domestic actors as it has previously been able to"
"The Common Foreign and Security Policy: an Emerging New Voice in International Politics?"
Helene Sjursen
ARENA
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp99_34.htm
6) "According to Allen and Smith, the difficulty in studying
Western Europe's international role is that 'the notion of a
'foreign policy' carries with it a conceptual framework which
is inseparable from the state-centric view of world politics'
(Allen and Smith 1991: 95). We tend to get stuck in this
state-centric view when analysing European foreign policy,
and therefore find it difficult to account for the growing
significance of the EU's international role."
"Enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Transforming the EU´s External Policy?"
Helene Sjursen ARENA, University of Oslo
ARENA Working Papers, WP 98/18
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp98_18.htm//
7) Although the Pope claimed universal authority (auctoritas) he never had, nor claimed, worldly power (potestas) to enforce his claim: the universal church and empire ended as early as 476 and as late as 1100. But in any event by 1400 the universal church did still exist - though there was no universal empire to enforce it s moral judgments.
8) "the CFSP: it is seen, at best, as little more than the sum of the foreign policies of the Member States"
"Enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Transforming the EU´s External Policy?"
Helene Sjursen ARENA, University of Oslo
ARENA Working Papers, WP 98/18
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp98_18.htm
9) "Enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Transforming the EU´s External Policy?"
Helene Sjursen
ARENA, University of Oslo
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp99_34.htm#
10) Furthermore, by 1995 NATO had started to develop the kind
of collective security mechanisms that many had expected to
see emerge within the EU framework
"Enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Transforming the EU´s External Policy?"
Helene Sjursen ARENA, University of Oslo
ARENA Working Papers, WP 98/18
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp98_18.htm
11) "The continued relevance
of NATO to European security was strengthened at the
NATO summit in Berlin in June 1996, where it was decided
that a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) should
be developed inside the framework of NATO. [6] A central
element in this strategy was the creation of mobile forces, the
so-called Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). It was
agreed that these forces would be available to the WEU for
European operations, in situations where the United States
itself would not wish to participate. This decision was
interpreted as a victory for the Atlanticists in the struggle
over the development of security structures in Europe (Duke
1996; Cornish 1996)."
"The Common Foreign and Security Policy: an Emerging New Voice in International Politics?"
Helene Sjursen
ARENA
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp99_34.htm
12) "After a failed attempt at establishing a European Defence
Community (EDC) and a European Political Community
(EPC) in the early 1950s, further efforts to make foreign
policy co-operation into the core of European integration
were abandoned. [1] Security and defence co-operation was
defined into an Atlantic context: Nato became the central
organisation for security and defence in West Europe and the
United States became guarantor of European security. As for
foreign policy, it remained within the realm of the nation
state."
"The Common Foreign and Security Policy: an Emerging New Voice in International Politics?"
Helene Sjursen
ARENA
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp99_34.htm
13) "In 1992, the co-called Petersberg declaration,
which defined the WEU's security tasks to include
peace-keeping, crisis-management and 'soft security', was
issued."
 "The Common Foreign and Security Policy: an Emerging New Voice in International Politics?"
Helene Sjursen
ARENA
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp99_34.htm
citing:
Petersberg Declaration. West European Union Council of Ministers. Bonn 19 June 1992.
14) "The Europeans lack military transport, especially heavy
aircraft capable of carrying tanks and artillery, and rely on
Nato for intelligence and logistical support. Their
performance in Kosovo last year varied from bad to
abysmal. With rotation, it could require 240,000 men to
meet the target of 60,000 available at any time."
German to lead ‚Euro-army'
By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard in Brussels and Michael Smith
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/et?ac=003838863354539&rtmo=fsYloVqs&atmo=rrrrrrrq&pg=/et/00/11/17/wger17.html
15) "Policy Paper 52: Understanding Europe’s "New" Common Foreign and Security Policy: A Primer for Outsiders"
Michael E. Smith
http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/publications/policy_papers/pp52.html
16)  "Policy Paper 52: Understanding Europe’s "New" Common Foreign and Security Policy: A Primer for Outsiders"
Michael E. Smith
http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/publications/policy_papers/pp52.html
17) "German to lead 'Euro-army'"
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard and Michael Smith
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/et?ac=003838863354539&rtmo=fsYloVqs&atmo=rrrrrrrq&pg=/et/00/11/17/wger17.html
18)"As regards the force structure, two generic concepts had  been developed for the deployment of task forces. The first  concept involved the Immediate Mechanised Force - Eurocorps acronym 'FIM' - for crisis-reaction and  peace-supporrt operations to include peace-enforcement  missions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  The second concerned the Immediate Light Force - Eurocorps acronym  'FIL' - for peace-support operations at the lower end of the  spectrum or humanitarian operations.
The FIM could be built up gradually within 20 to 60 days based upon a nucleus of five brigades. In FIM's mobile operations within a complex environment, the use of divisional headquarters as an intermediate level of command was provided."
"The organisation of operational links  between NATO, WEU and the EU"
WEU, Defence Committee, Mr. De Decker, Chairman and Rapporteur
Document 1624, 9 November 1998
http://www.weu.int/eng/info/faweu.htm
18) "The organisation of operational links  between NATO, WEU and the EU"
WEU, Defence Committee, Mr. De Decker, Chairman and Rapporteur
Document 1624, 9 November 1998
http://www.weu.int/eng/info/faweu.htm
19) "The organisation of operational links  between NATO, WEU and the EU"
WEU, Defence Committee, Mr. De Decker, Chairman and Rapporteur
Document 1624, 9 November 1998
http://www.weu.int/eng/info/faweu.htm
20) "German to lead ‚Euro-army'"
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard and Michael Smith
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/et?ac=003838863354539&rtmo=fsYloVqs&atmo=rrrrrrrq&pg=/et/00/11/17/wger17.html
21) "The Common Foreign and Security Policy: an Emerging New Voice in International Politics?"
Helene Sjursen
ARENA
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp99_34.htm
22) "The text of the Maastricht Treaty was vague enough to satisfy both the maximalists, such as France, who wanted to see stronger integration in security and defence, and the minimalists, most importantly Britain, who wished to continue with status quo. The question of whether or not the EU could give direct instructions to the WEU was particularly unclear. The Maastricht Treaty also stressed that the development of a common European security policy should not in any way prejudice or challenge Atlantic security co-operation."
Helene Sjursen
"The Common Foreign and Security  Policy: an Emerging New Voice in International Politics?"
ARENA
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp99_34.htm
23) "On the Cusp: Britain, Maastricht and European Security"
Anne Deighton
European University Institute, Working Paper RSC No 97/59
24) "The Belgian Empire. The Balkan Stability Pact and the European Army"
Emmanuel Goldstein
http://www.antiwar.com/goldstein/g121599.html
25) Le Nouvel Explorateur
"En plein conflit des Balkans l'Eurocorps, une armée au chômage."
http://www.esj-lille.fr/atelier/explo/EVENEMENT/EVE_09.HTM
26) "The failure of the CFSP to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia
gave renewed ammunition to its critics. The wave of
optimism about the European Community's ability to forge a
new and more influential place for itself at the international
arena at the end of the Cold War died down. Although
traditional security and defence capabilities were seen to
matter less, the EU's dependence on the United States in
situations of crisis did not seem to have declined."
"Enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Transforming the EU´s External Policy?"
Helene Sjursen ARENA, University of Oslo
ARENA Working Papers, WP 98/18
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp98_18.htm



BIBLIOGRAPHY

"On the Cusp: Britain, Maastricht and European Security"
Anne Deighton
European University Institute, Working Paper RSC No 97/59

German to lead ‚Euro-army'
By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard in Brussels and Michael Smith
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/et?ac=003838863354539&rtmo=fsYloVqs&atmo=rrrrrrrq&pg=/et/00/11/17/wger17.html

"The Belgian Empire. The Balkan Stability Pact and the European Army"
Emmanuel Goldstein
http://www.antiwar.com/goldstein/g121599.html

Le Nouvel Explorateur
"En plein conflit des Balkans l'Eurocorps, une armée au chômage."
www.esj-lille.fr/atelier/explo/EVENEMENT/EVE_09.HTM

"Enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Transforming the EU´s External Policy?"
Helene Sjursen ARENA, University of Oslo
ARENA Working Papers, WP 98/18
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp98_18.htm

"The Common Foreign and Security Policy: an Emerging New Voice in International Politics?"
Helene Sjursen
ARENA
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp99_34.htm

"Policy Paper 52: Understanding Europe’s "New" Common Foreign and Security Policy: A Primer for Outsiders"
Michael E. Smith
http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/publications/policy_papers/pp52.html

"The organisation of operational links  between NATO, WEU and the EU"
WEU, Defence Committee, Mr. De Decker, Chairman and Rapporteur
Document 1624, 9 November 1998
http://www.weu.int/eng/info/faweu.htm

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