Table of Contents

Introduction: Rio, Kyoto and European Legislation

I: Preliminary Questions and Problems

A. Preliminary Problem: Economic Evaluation
B. Preliminary Question: Is the community competent to tax?
C. Concurrent Jurisdiction:
D. Legal Principles:

A. Labeling
B. Environmental Funds
C. Taxation

1. Taxes and free movement of goods
2. Ecotaxes

D. Case Law

Notes

Bibliography

Introduction: Rio, Kyoto and European Legislation

In the face of increasing evidence of global warming, a major international accords has been concluded, (1) Recently at Kyoto (2) steps were taken to actually implement the environmental objectives of Rio. Unfortunately however Rio remains largely hortatory, and has had little, if any, binding effect. The Rio accord resulted in a Community Directive, Com(97)30. Com(97)30 is intended to help the community shape policies to reduce Carbon Dioxide and Sulfur Dioxide emissions.(3) CO2 and SO2 are respectively responsable for global warming and acid rain.

The positive legislation is straightforward. The tax is to be introduced by the community, but implemented through the member states. The tax is to be levied both on carbon content and on energy content. Energy content is taxed in order to avoid the problem of distortion. If only carbon were taxed, the French economy would be favored because France relies on nuclear power wherever possible to meet its energy needs. In principle the tax is to be economically neutral. The tax shall be a uniform minimum throughout the community. Member states are free to enact higher tax rates however. The tax shall only be introduced when similar measures are introduced by other OECD states.(4)
 
 

I: Preliminary Questions and Problems

Given the inefficacity - at least until present - of the Rio/Kyoto regime, our analysis will focus on EU ecotaxes. Our analysis begins with considerations which are preconditions to the elaboration and application of effective positive law.
 
 

A. Preliminary Problem: Economic Evaluation

When studying economic aspects of law, it is always prudent to remember the limits of economics. While economics is the most empirical of the social sciences, it is still somewhat inexact. Economic evaluations of costs and benefits can reveal a range of possible values from minima to maxima. However determining the exact value of any economic good is simply not possible (5)- though, as we have said, approximations of value yielding reasonable high and low values (minima and maxima) are possible.

B. Preliminary Question: Is the community competent to tax?

The first question is whether the community has the legal power to impose taxes on member states. Some authors have asserted that the community has no power to tax.(6) Others have stated that in fact the community can level taxes on member states or their citizens.(7)

To answer this question we must examine provisions of the treaty dealing with taxation, and provisions dealing with environmental protection.

Tax Provisions

Article 93 provides that the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the commision and after consulting the European Parliament and Economic and Social Committee, adopt provisions for the harmonisation of indirect taxation. Art 93 is facially only a harmonisation provision. It does not provide any independant taxation power but does give the Community the power to issue directives and regulations to harmonize national taxation. Further this power to harmonise community taxes is limited to that harmonisation necessary to achieve the single market. This position is supported not only by the language of Art. 93 but also by the interpretative doctrine of subsidiarity.

Environmental Provisions

Art. 175 in contrast is an environmental provision. Art. 175 does not provide for harmonisation of national laws. Rather Art. 175 provides an independant community power to levy taxation, limited in that such taxation must be directed to environmental or health purposes. It is facially evident that Art. 175 is not a provision to harmonise national law, but an independant power of the community to establish minimum standards. This position is supported by the fact that Art. 176 clearly permits member states to enact higher standards than those adopted by the community, so long as those standards are consistent with the treaty, notably Art. 28, 30, and 95.
 
 

In examining the treaty, article 175(2) (former art. 130 S) clearly provides that in order to achieve environmental goals - an essential goal of the community - the community can in fact impose taxes. For example, imagine the following: the community decides to levy a 1% TVA in addition to the existing TVA of the member states. 175(2) does require such a tax to be dedicated to environmental purposes listed in Art. 174, but also clearly authorizes taxation by the Council - although gathering the political will to obtain the required unanimity in 175 may be impossible, it is at least theoretically possible.
 
 

C. Concurrent Jurisdiction:

Since the community's power to tax for environmental purposes is provided in the treaty, ecotaxes are clearly an area of concurrent jurisdiction. Since the jurisdiction over ecological taxation is concurrent, the use of ecological taxation as a type of regulatory measure - that is, taxing pollution to discourage it - is not a per se violation of community law.(8) This can be further justified by the fact that the environmental protection is an essential goal of the community. Article 176 clearly provides that community law is to establish minima, and that so long as consistent with other provisions of the treaty (notably Art. 28 free movement of goods) national protective measures which are stricted than the community environmental standards are permitted, which also supports concurrent jurisdiction.

D. Legal Principles:

When studying civil law it is useful to consider the principles from which it flows. Two principles of environmental law are that waste should be treated as close to its source as possible (the source principle) and that costs of environmental cleanup should be born by the polluter (the polluter pays principle). These principles can help shape not only regulation but also taxation.

Another principle increasingly recognized in tax law is that of revenue and economic neutrality. Revenue neutrality is simply the pragmatic observation that a change in the taxation system which is revenu neutral is easier to justify than a change which increases revenues. Thus the proposed ecotax is to be revenue neutral. Proposed ecotax to be revenue neutral(9) which while not a legal principle is nevertheless pragmatically the tendancy of current tax policy. Economic neutrality on the other hand may be considerd not only a practical or political principle, but even a general principle of tax law. The principle of economic neutrality holds that taxation should have as little effect on the economy as possible. Environmental taxation is a derogation of the principle of economic neutrality, but this derogation is justified as ecotaxes are one method of forcing polluters to internalize the social costs of pollution rather than profiting from polluting innocent persons. This derogation is thus consistent with the liberal perspective which generated the principle of economic neutrality.
 
 

II: Remedies

There are 3 instruments which the EU plans to use to control pollution: taxes, regulatory standards, and research and design incentives.(10) The majority of our analysis will consider ecological taxation.
 

A. Labeling

Labelling is simply the indication that a product is environmentally friendly or unfriendly.(11) If certain production or disposal methods are used then the good is required or permitted to carry a label so indicating.
 

B. Environmental Funds

We consider environmental funds briefly as they are generally funded by ecotaxes. Environmental funds are also closely connected to ecotaxes as their object is the same: reduction of pollution, and environmental cleanup.

An environmental fund is a combination of a tax and incentive scheme. Essentially, a polluting activity is taxed. This taxation can be used as an indirect incentive. Tax credits, accelerated depreciation, and funding for research and development have all been used at the national level to encourage environmental clean up. Revenue can also be used for direct subsidization of local industries which use environmentally friendly methods.

Although both direct subsidizations and indirect tax incentives will have the same economic consequences and are not direct discrimination against imported goods, direct subsidization of environmentally friendly industry through the penalization of environmentally unfriendly industry will be much more likely to fall awry of the provisions of ex-Article 30. This is because while this plan is economically neutral, it amounts to a domestic subsidy which will fall at least partly on imported goods and potentially more heavily on imported goods - as the cases of Danish Bottles, Danish Autos, and Disposable razors illustrate. Even a plan involving indirect funding through taxation is potentially a violation of Article 30. In other words,

"an environmental fund for the support of domestic producers only, but financed by a levy on both domestic and imported goods would thus fall under the prohibition in Article 12. Further, such refunds may raise problems under the specific treaty provisions on subsidies." (12)

A member state's environmental fund could also be contrary to Art. 25 and 90 of the European Community Treaty. Article 25 clearly prohibits import or export duties. Thus ecological taxation would have to be imposed at point of sale or transformation. This in effect limits ecotaxes to sales taxes, value added taxes, or flat licensing fees. Even then Art. 90 clearly provides that such taxation must not have the effect of indirect protectionism. This raises the question of whether discriminatory affect or discrimintory intent or both are required to trigger Art. 90. On its own terms, Art. 90 does not answer this question. However when we recognize that the intention of the treaty is to create a single market we must admit that discriminatory affect or discriminatory intent alone is sufficient to trigger Art. 90. Of course proving discrimintory intent is difficulty. However proving discriminatory effect is relatively straightforward. Thus in practice proving discriminatory effect should suffice to render a member state’s legislation illegal. However if discriminatory intent is proven that too, alone, should suffice to render member state legislation unlawful.

Thus member states must be careful when drafting remedies for environmental delicts not to run afoul of community law.

If the problem is the percieved subsidization of domestic as opposed to foreign industry, and the percieved discrimination against imports the remedy may simply to be to provide the same tax benefits or subsidizations to foreign and domestic producers.

Unfortunately this is not as easy as it may seem. Imagine a member state which wishes to fund its landfills. In order to due so it imposes a tax on pollution. While a tax on batteries, which contain lead, and thus are difficult to dispose of, can be justified as reasonable means, the end, favoring national waste disposers is impermissible, unless exempted under Article 30 (ex Art. 36). Or for example, a tax on disposable razors - in a country which produces no razors, or a tax on autos, in a country which produces no autos. If the tax in question does not punish foreign competitors in practice, or in theory then it will likely be upheld. But if the tax punishes foreign goods, in practice or in theory, it is likely to be stricken. Which explains why it would be more difficult to justify subsidization. Subsidization almost invariably funds only domestic industry, at least in practice, if not also in theory. It is difficult to imagine any state in practice subsidizing foreign industries, though subsidizing foreign environmentally friendly industries is good not only for the environment but also for the single market. The impossibility to break nationalistic tendancies explains why environmental taxation may well best be levied by the community rather than the member states.

Risk of fraud

In the above hypothetical, the author believes the better case would be to allow the imposition of a tax on the polluting good to pay for the necessary environmental clean up that that product entails.

The court could rule either way however, since clearly such a measure would favor national waste producers over foreign waste producers. Such an interpretation is possible due to the general character of the Treaty, and supports the position of legal realism that law is an arbitrary positive command of the soveriegn. The legal decision can be unforseeable or even arbitrary.

It this tax and finance scheme is a contravention of the Amsterdam Treaty – which we cannot say from the court’s decisions because the answer to this question is uncertain – then the only possible remedy would then be a remittance scheme. If a tax credit were allowed for reexporting the polluting item this scheme becomes theoretically justifiable - but practically less workable. One of the points of Danish Bottles is that while practicality and market transparency are usually mutually supportive, they can be in opposition.

This example raises the question of tax treatment of waste and goods which shall be analayzed below.
 

C. Taxation

Ecotaxes, whether enacted by the community or member state, serves three interrelated goals: energy independance, environmental cleanup and protection, and encouraging creation of employment in waste treatment. That all these goals are desirable is however counterbalanced by the belief that such taxes may hinder industrial growth. However what use is industrial growth if the consequence is cancer, birth defects, and respiratory illness? Whatever normative perspective one takes, juridicially ecological taxation by member states raises the question of the free movement of goods alluded to above.
 
 

1. Taxes and free movement of goods

The first point to mention in the question of the role of taxes in environmental clean up is that taxes is that the Article 30 (ex art-36) exemptions could be applied to tax schemes for environmental purposes. Thus taxes on pollution, even where touching free movement of goods and services, are not unthinkable.(14)

However while ecological customs duties are not necessarily impossible they are difficult to implement. This is partly because the distinction between internal taxation and customs duties is a fine one. (15)

Simply imposing tax on a good not produced by a member state will not be considered a restriction of free movement of goods. However where that tax distinguishes between the domestic market and the foreign market through a tax reduction for resale - even though this avoids double taxation - the tax will be seen as opposed to the free movement of goods provisions of Article 30 (ex-Art 36).(16) The Article 28 freedom is not expressed as a presumption of illegality for state taxation which affects interstate trade, though in practice it could be seen as such and such a judicial interpretation in case law is always possible.

The Union’s legal decisions manifest a willingness to accept environmental protections as necessary for the safeguard of health. How is the national legislator to best protect the citizen while remaining in conformity with the treaty obligations? The community has two approaches:

1) Establish exceptions to the non-discrimination rule

2) Harmonise member states environmental standards.

However subsidiarity and competition of regulatory systems limit harmonization.(17)
 

2. Ecotaxes

Although an ecotax has been proposed at the European level it has not been implemented. Apart from the the diesel oil excise tax no ecotaxes exist at the EU level (18)- though many such taxes exist at the level of member states and suggestions for such taxes have been made repeatedly at the union level.(19) This is unfortunate: pollution does not respect man made boundaries. By its nature pollution is international, and thus the best way to adress the problem of pollution would be through the creation of uniform EU standards, either through harmonization of existing legislation or through the creation of concurrent legislation at the EU level. (20)
 

Part of the reason for the failure to adopt a community level ecotax - although the community does need to develop its own sources of revenue - is due to the incidence of such taxes. Industry complains that taxing energy, a primary input, reduces competitivity and increases end user costs. This argument misses the point however: what good is it to have cheap abundant plastic and petroleum products if one also has poisonous air and water? While ecotaxes might violate the WTO, the EU is to be an economic unit, and preferably a self sufficient one. Thus if higher standards in Europe - which translate into a better life for Europeans - lead to competitition problems with the US all Europe needs to do is create compensatory taxes on imports. These can be levied until such point as the US agrees not to pollute its neighbors in the interests of enriching industrialists at the expense of everyone else.

A second area of incidence which explains why the ecotax has not yet been adopted at the EU level is the fact that such taxes are seen as being regressive with respect to the elderly. This regressivity can however be corrected by a compensatory payment through a tax credit or other family benefit. Thus gradually introducing transitional measures will allow the community to mitigate the problems of incidence.(21)

D.  Case Law

Three key cases form the core of the communities' ecotax jurisprudence. These are Danish Bottles, Danish Autos, and BIC Disposable Razors. Each of these three "central decisions" has generated in turn several cases. Still although the case law is fairly well developed and though the court has indicated the broad lines of its interpretations of the treaty, there are still unanswered questions and some ambiguities in the courts' answers.

Although eco-taxes can present a contravention of the right of free movement of goods, the exception of Art. 30 (ex art. 36) for attaining environmental objectives can be applied . But though  ecological customs and duties at borders are thus not theoretically impossible they are still very difficult to justify and in practice are not allowed. This however is problematic: The distinction between inland taxation and customs and duties on imports is a fine one. Imposing a tax on foreign goods will not always be a contravention of the right to free movement of goods when the same inland produced goods are taxed in the same measure. However here such a tax distinguishes between the single market and the foreign market through a tax reduction for resale - although this avoids multiple taxation - the tax will present a contravention of tthe right of free movement of goods. The freedom of Art. 28 is not a presumption that the taxation of trade between member states is a contravention of the treaty - though in practice that is its effect. This de facto presumption could develop into a de jure presumption through the case law. Such a development is possible, and possibly necessary, because of poor legal reasoning which blurs the distinction between "waste" and "wares". That blurred non-destinction could be blamed on the generality of the treaty. But in conjunction with the problem of determining whether the tax is a discrimination on trade between member states it leads to potential confusion.

1. Commn. V. Denmark (C-302/86) (Danish bottles)

In this case Denmark had a system wherein only readily recyclable bottles could be used for the sale of certain beverages. This recycling system however inconvenienced major manufacturors which would have had to change their production processes, possibly involving the establishment of production or recycling facilities in Denmark.

The court did not look to the factual question of whether this law would lead to the establishment of such facilities but instead noted that the Danish system could have been established to accommodate the interests of the major importers. The ratio decidendi  were:
1. Reasonable restrictions on waste processing which do not actually or potentially present a limitation of free movement of goods are permissible.
2. Limitations on the free movement of goods must use the least restrictive means.

In terms of comparative law, this appears to develop a "means-end" test for reasonability which would be familiar to scholars of American constitutional law. The court did not in its decision rely on any American precedent for its decision however the point should be made that the legal formula that a law, to be constitutional, must be a "reasonable means to permissible ends" is a well known principle of American constitutional law.
 

2. Commn v. Denmark (Danish Autos) (Art. 95) (C-47/88).

In this case a Danish tax on autos was attacked as a contravention of ex Art. 95 and ex Art. 30. Denmark produces no autos and taxed auto sales in Denmark in order to protect the environement. The issue was whether this taxation was a breach of the EU treaty. The taxation was determined a breach of the treaty. While Art. 30 is potentially a better grounds for complaint, Art. 95 could also be applicable since the affected market was not only for new vehicles but also the market for used vehicles - that is the tax applied to "inland" sales as well. So while Denmark wants a clean environment it cannot tax importation of autos to get it, even where it taxes used auto sales as well.

In normative terms this case can be rightly criticised: the environment is an essential goal of the community and to achieve it public transport should be favored and private transport disfavored. Further this tax was non-regressive, i.e. it affected not the poor but the middle incomes and the rich. Thus this case, despite the goal of free movement, represents an encroachment of the EU into the policy of a member state. That encroachment was, in this author's opinion, contrary to the interests of the Union for it leads to the false perception of the Union as heavy handed anti-environment pro-business tyrant.
 

3. Disposable Razors (Art 177; Dir. 83/189) (C-13/96)

Belgium introduced a taxation and labelling system to favor environmental conservation. This system required a label upon products which are environmentally hazardous. In the case the taxed and labelled goods were disposable razors. This taxation and labelling scheme was not considered a contravention of the treaty. Thus it is possible to establish workable environmental policies. This case represents a retreat from the harsh position taking in Danish bottles.
 
 

Conclusion: Prisoner's Dilemma

Ecotaxes are necessary not only to fight global warming, but also to fight poor air quality, source of asthma, bronchitis, and other respiratory illness right up to empyhsema and even cancer, particularly in urban areas – where most people live. If ecotaxes are both necessary and logically possible, why have they not been implemented?

We have already shown that ecotaxes raise the questions of incidence and regressivity. Ecotaxes are percieved – in this author’s opinion wrongly – as reducing economic growth and competitivity. Ecotaxes do change economic activity, however they shift the emphasis of economic production from quantity to quality which in a highly developed economy is perfectly sensible. As to international competitiveness, Europe is a single market. At the extreme,  it is under no obligation to participate in the WTO. Finally the effect of incidence of the tax upon the market can be avoided: economic restructuring can be encouraged through dedicating the revenues generated by ecotaxes not only to environmental clean up but also to economic restructuring.

The regressivity of ecotaxes can also be avoided.. Although ecotaxes will impact somewhat more on the elderly, who burn more fuel in the winter to keep warm, tax credits or subsidization can correct the negative effects of this tax – and any tax has negative effects.

The real difficulty with implementing ecotaxes then is political. Differing areas of the Union have different concerns. Scandinavia has a large but fragile rural ecosystem which is being ruined by acid rain. In contrast, acid rain is less of a concern in Britain, particularly since the prevailing winds blow SO2 from Britain to Europe, particularly Scandinavia. This is just one example, though perhaps the most famous, of cross border inter-community pollution. It illustrates however the kernel of the problem of pollution: Britain has every incentive to pollute: lower production costs with fewer negative environmental effects. Scandinavia, in effect, winds up footing the bill for British pollution. The cross-border nature of air pollution explains why air pollution is best handled at a European or even global level. However finding the necessary political will to do so is problematic given competing interests. Divergent national agendas, diverse national tax systems, both at the European and within the Union’s member states, explain why passing any European ecotax has been stalled for so long.

The ecotax question shows the problem of competition in economics. NAFTA and the EU are in a classic case of "prisoners dilemma":(22) if neither pollutes both are better off. If one pollutes, the non polluting trading regime is unfairly penalized. And the result of this state of affairs is that in fact both pollute and have failed to follow through on their commitments. While hardly surprising this is disheartening. This "race to the bottom" explains why ecotaxes are best implemented at the European or even global level. However given that their are economic incentives to pollute, and given the difficulty of unifying the opinion of political elites,  preventing pollution through transnational law will be difficult. Juridical solutions to the problems of pollution and waste management exist. Transforming those solutions into political reality is however problematic, at least outside the sphere of national politics.

Notes

1) The Rio accord. Agenda 21 - The First five years;
Eine Energiepolitik der Europäische Union,
KOM(95)682. Weissbuch

2) Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften,
Grünbuch zum handel mit Treibhausgasemissionen in der Europäischen Union.

3) Europäische Kommission,
Steuerpolitik in der Europäischen Union, p. 21.

4) European Commission,
Taxation of Energy Products
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l27019.htm

5) "clearly the correct amount of such charges to offset the costs of internal regulation is not a matter which is susceptible of firm and precise calculation"
Gerry Cross,
"Subsidiarity and the Environment"
Yearbook of European Law, No. 15 (1995), at 130.

6) C. Randzio Plath, "die Steuererhebungkompetenz hat die EG bis heute nicht"
Zur Steuerpolitik der EG in Binnenmarkt, Libertas: 1993.

7) Birk, Handbuch des Europäischen Steuer und Abgabenrechts,
Berlin: Verlag Neue Wirtschaftsbriefe Herne (1995) p. 309.

8) Gerry Cross,
"Subsidiarity and the Environment",
Yearbook of European Law,
No. 15, (1995) p. 107 at 126.

9) Farmer/Loyal,
EC Tax Law,
Oxford: Clarendon (1994) p. 245.

10) Rolf Wägenbauer, Richard Wainright,
Yearbook of European Law,
"Community Energy and Environment Policy", p. 76.

11) Caroline London,
"Droit Communautaire de l'Environnement"
Revue Trimestrielle du Droit European,
Vol. 33 No. 2, Avril-Juin 1997. p. 291.

12) Andreas Ziegler,
The common Market and the Environment: Striking a Balance
Bamberg: Difo-Druck (1995) p. 47.

13) Gerry Cross,
"Subsidiarity and the Environment",
Yearbook of European Law,
No. 15 (1995) p. 128.

14) Farmer and Loyal,
EC Tax Law.
Oxford: Clarendon (1994). p. 34 et seq.

15) 16C-47/88 Commn. v. Denmark (Danish Autos)

16) C-47/88 Commn. v. Denmark (Danish Autos)

17) Andreas Ziegler,
The Common Market and the Environment: Striking a Balance.
Bamberg: Difo-Druck (1995) p. 5-6.

18) "Die Verbrauchsteuern auf Mineralölerzeugnisse, eine wichtige staatlich Steuereinnahmequelle, variieren stark zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten. Vergleichbare Verbrauchsteuern auf andere Energieerzeugnisse sind auf Gemeinschaftsebene nicht eingeführt worden, und die Kommission wird untersuchen, ob diese Steuern auf konkurrierende Energieerzeugnisse ausgeweitet werden sollten. Hier ist eine sehr sorgfältige Prüfung vorzunehmen, da die einzelnen Energieträger unterschiedlichen Preisgestaltungskonzepten unterliegen (Mehrkosten/Marktwert) und es eine gewisse ungleiche Behandlung von Brennstoffen für vergleichbaren Gebrauch gibt. Es sei angemerkt, daß einige Mitgliedstaaten auf eigene Initiative und im Einklang mit geltendem Gemeinschaftsrecht Steuern auf konkurrierende Energieträger (Erdgas und Kohle) erheben."
EU:
Eine Energiepolitik der Europäische Union,
KOM(95)682, Weissbuch

19) "Steuer auf Kohlendioxidemissionen und Energie:
1. ZIEL
Begrenzung der Treibhausgasemissionen und Förderung eines rationellen Energieeinsatzes durch Einführung einer harmonisierten Zusatzsteuer auf Kohlendioxidemissionen und ihres Energiegehalts.
2. VORSCHLAG..."
EU,
Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie des Rates zur Einführung einer Steuer auf Kohlendioxidemissionen und Energie. http://europa.eu.int/index-de.htm

20) "les travaux n'ont pas encore débouché sur aucune mésure communautaire d'importance"
Gabriel Montagnier
"Harmonisation Fiscale Communautaire".
Revue Trimestrielle du Droit European,
Vol. 33 No. 2, Avril-Juin 1997. S 345, at 350.

21) Gradual introduction of ecotaxes coupled with a transition period.
Rolf Wägenbauer, Richard Wainright,
Yearbook of European Law, "Community Energy and Environment Policy", 59 at 77.

22) Farmer/Loyal, EC Tax Law, Oxford: Clarendon (1994). p. 245.

COURT CASES:

SpA Marimax v. Italian Finance Administration
C-29/72

Alfonse Lüttike GMbH v. Hauptzollamt Saarlouis
C-57/65

Bobie Getrankvertrieb GmBH v. Hauptzollamt Aachen Nord
C-127/75

Bresciani v. Amministrazione Italian delle Finanze
C-87/75

Chemical v. DAF SpA
C-140/79

Demag AG v. Finanzamt Duisberg
C-27/74

BIC Benelux v. Belgie
C-13/961997 ECR I_1753

STATUTES

Proposed Statute: OJ 1992, C196/1
Richtlinienantrag des Rates für eine CO2 und Energiesteuer
Com(92) 226 - Final

Steuer auf Kohlendioxidemissionen und Energie
EU, Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie des Rates zur Einführung einer Steuer auf Kohlendioxidemissionen und Energie.
http://europa.eu.int/index-de.htm
 
 

ARTICLES

"Fiscal Federalism"
Journal of European Public Policy
No. 3, (1996).

Damian Chambers
"Environmental Law"
Yearbook of Environmental Law
Oxford: Clarendon vol. 17, (1998).

Rolf Wägenbauer, Richard Wainright
"Gradual introduction of ecotaxes coupled with a transition period. "
Yearbook of European Law, "Community Energy and Environment Policy"

Gerry Cross "Subsidiarity and the Environment"
Yearbook of European Law,
No. 15 (1995), at 130.
 

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